Revenue Equivalence Revisited by Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C.
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 

























*Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics,  
Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany. ivanova@wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
**Timothy C. Salmon, Florida State University, Department of Economics, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-2180.  




Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
 
Discussion Paper No. 175 
Revenue Equivalence Revisited 
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel* 







The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that ﬁrst price sealed bid auctions
tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more eﬃcient. We re-examine
these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which
auction format to participate. Our ﬁndings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending
auction than the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up
the revenue diﬀerence between the formats. Consequently, we ﬁnd that both formats raise
approximately the same amount of revenue. They also generate eﬃciency levels and bidder
earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending
might be slightly higher. In expected utility terms though, we ﬁnd that the expected utility of
entering a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction is greater than entering an ascending for any risk averse
bidder suggesting that we are seeing “overentry” into the ascending auctions.
JEL Codes: C91,D 4 4
Key Words: bidder preferences, private values, sealed bid auctions, ascending auctions, en-
dogenous entry
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Early work in the auction literature focused on the famous Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) for
which the principles were established in Vickrey (1961) and then later proven to be more general in
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). The claims of the base version of the theorem are
that so long as the assumptions of the symmetric independent private values (SIPV) environment
hold, then all standard auctions will yield the same expected proﬁt to an auctioneer and the same
expected surplus to bidders.1 As important and fundamental result as this was and is to the auction
literature, it has to date received little empirical support. Since the publication of Cox, Roberson,
and Smith (1982) it has been a long established and easily re-veriﬁed result that the RET fails to
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1The key assumptions underlying this theorem, as described in Krishna (2002), are independence of bidder values,
risk neutrality of bidders, lack of bidder budget constraints and that all bidder values are drawn from the same
distribution. The formal requirements that two mechanisms in the SIPV environment must satisfy in order to apply
the RET are that (i) a bidder with a value of v must have the same probability of winning in both and (ii) a bidder
who draws the lowest value in the range, v, must expect the same surplus in both institutions.
1universally hold and in particular that ﬁrst price sealed bid auctions generate signiﬁcantly more
revenue than ascending auctions in the SIPV environment.2 For example, Kagel and Levin (1993)
show that in auctions with ﬁve bidders ﬁrst price auctions generate signiﬁcantly greater average
revenues than second price auctions. When applying the “bid function approach”, i.e. each subject
submits a complete vector of bids (a bid function), Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel, Königstein, and Strobel
(2002) ﬁnd that the switch from ﬁrst price to second price rule leads to substantial decrease in
expected prices.
The reason the RET fails to hold is that bidders are found to bid above the risk neutral Nash
equilibrium in the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction which leads to higher than expected revenue. The
standard equilibrium prediction works well for the ascending auction leading to revenue in-line with
the standard prediction. While the reason for the “overbidding” observed in ﬁrst price auctions
has generated a substantial amount of controversy over the years (see the December 1992 issue of
American Economic Review as well as Kagel (1995) for a sampling of the arguments), the fact of
the overbidding and it’s implication for which mechanism will generate more revenue have been
generally well accepted. We seek to call this conventional wisdom into question.
This is related to an empirical puzzle regarding the auction formats actually used by auctioneers,
which is that despite all of the evidence collected on this issue suggesting that ﬁrst price auctions
are revenue dominant, the ascending auction dominates ﬁeld applications. In one survey of online
auction sites, Lucking-Reiley (2000) ﬁnds that of 142 surveyed auction sites, 121 use ascending
price auctions while only 21 used sealed bid auctions. It is diﬃcult to explain this preponderance
of ascending auctions based on the assumption that auctioneers are revenue maximizers and the
assumption that the previous laboratory evidence that ﬁrst price auctions raise more revenue trans-
lates into ﬁeld applications. Our study will attempt to provide a solution for this contradiction
based on forces one will observe in markets but are unaccounted for in previous laboratory studies,
i.e. endogenous entry choice by the bidders.
Previous investigations of the revenue generation abilities of ﬁrst price sealed bid and ascending
auctions have typically shared one key aspect in common. This is the assumption that the number
of bidders, n, is ﬁxed and constant across both mechanisms. Thus the correct way to state the
established empirical result is that given a common number of bidders, the sealed bid ﬁrst price
auction will raise more money than an ascending auction. In naturally occurring auctions, though,
the number of bidders at an auction is not exogenously determined and ﬁxed. Our question is what
happens to the revenue generation of the two auction formats when n i sn o th e l dc o n s t a n ta c r o s s
both formats but is allowed to vary endogenously based on the choices of the bidders.
This is an important auction design issue because auctioneers can not generally force bidders to
participate in their auctions. Perhaps the key ability of a successful auctioneer is his or her ability
to attract bidders to an auction. While there are many factors involved in attracting bidders to
an auction (e.g., the entry or reserve price, the reputation of the seller, the quality of the listing),
our view is that the format of the auction itself may be one of the important factors for the entry
decision of a bidder.
There is existing theoretical and empirical literature that examines entry decisions in regard to
auctions most of it, however, is in contexts quite diﬀerent than the one we are concerned with here.
For example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Pevnitskaya (2004) and Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2004)
consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the eﬀect of endogenous entry
on bidding behavior. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), Lucking-Reiley (1999a) and Levin and Smith
(1994) look at the choice of which auction to enter based upon the entry price or reserve price
2Other violations are also found. For example, the Dutch auction can generate lower revenues than the ﬁrst price
auction and the English auction may yield lower revenue than the second price auction (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus
(1980), Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987)).
2being the main or even only characteristic upon which the auctions diﬀer. Our point of concern
is to look at an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose which auction
to participate in when the main characteristic that distinguishes the auctions is the format being
used and to re-examine the generally accepted opinion that ﬁrst price auctions tend to make more
money while ascending auctions tend to be more eﬃcient.
In prior work, Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) and Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2005), we
established that bidders do prefer ascending (English) and Vickrey auctions, i.e. second price rule,
to ﬁrst price sealed bid auctions (will be abbreviated as just the “sealed bid” auction) on a ceteris
paribus basis and that they are typically willing to pay a higher entry fee to participate in ascending
auctions instead of sealed bid auctions on the basis of that preference.3 This was determined by
ﬁrst allowing subjects to choose to enter into either a two-bidder ascending or sealed bid auction at
equal entry fees multiple times and then raising the entry price on the auction format they chose
most often to determine how much they were willing to pay for this preference. We discovered that
the bidders were not willing to pay an entry fee to get into the ascending auction up to a level
that would make a risk neutral person indiﬀerent between the two formats. Generally, our subjects
would cease paying the higher entry fee for the ascending auction and instead choose the sealed bid
auction at a price at which, even with the higher entry fee, their expected proﬁtw o u l dh a v eb e e n
greater by choosing the ascending auction. This lead to our result discussed in Ivanova-Stenzel
and Salmon (2004b) showing that auctioneers could not exploit this revealed preference for the
ascending auction by using entry fees. Alternatively, we also found that if we assumed bidders
were risk averse and estimated their CRRA parameter based on some initial training rounds, these
parameters predicted the nature of the switch-over prices quite well except that on average subjects
were willing to pay more than predicted. We then extrapolated from these revealed preferences to
show that if our model were accurate then many of these bidders would have been willing to enter
into ascending auctions with 3, 4 and perhaps even more bidders instead of a sealed bid auction
with only 2. This result suggests very strong preferences for the ascending auction that auctioneers
m a yb ea b l et oe x p l o i tp r o ﬁtably through a competitive eﬀect by using ascending auctions instead
of sealed bid auctions.
In this paper we will present the results of an experiment designed to test these propositions.
That is, would bidders in fact be willing to enter larger ascending than sealed bid auctions and
if so, which auction format ends up earning more revenue? Our results will show that more
bidders choose to enter the ascending than the sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough
to make up the revenue diﬀerence between the formats. Consequently we ﬁnd that there is no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the revenue raised by the two formats. Further, we ﬁnd both
to be equally eﬃcient and to generate close to the same average earnings to bidders though the
ascending generates slightly more. This leads to an intriguing outcome which is that we ﬁnd that
the claims of the RET can be nearly restored after one of the assumptions in the theorem is violated,
i.e. equal numbers of bidders in both auction formats.
There is a related paper, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2005), that considers auction choice
experiments similar to ours. The authors also allow endogenous entry between the two formats
and one ﬁnds results embedded in their tables similar to those for which we will provide evidence.
However, examining the revenue diﬀerences and such between the auction formats was not a focus
of that paper. Furthermore, their results are based on small sample sizes (in some cases a single
session) which means that their results can only be taken as a preliminary investigation of this phe-
3We note that this result requires symmetric bidders. Klemperer (2002) argues that ascending auctions can
discourage the entry of any disadvantaged or weak bidders because they know their chances of winning are very
small. This claim is supported by Goeree and Oﬀerman (2002). Our work is aimed at situations in which all bidders
are ap r i o r iequivalent as should be the case in most on-line auction markets.
3nomenon. Based on seeing some of their results, the authors were not convinced that their subjects
were able to accurately understand expected proﬁtd i ﬀerences between auction institutions. The
thrust of that study involved using various experimental treatments to understand the diﬃculties
subjects have in evaluating diﬀerences in expected proﬁts derived from diﬀerences in auction for-
mats. Their concern is that “the standard laboratory setting, where subjects see a randomly-drawn
v a l u ee a c hp e r i o dm a k e st h ep r o b l e mm o r ed i ﬃcult by impeding learning because subjects do not
see outcomes of their actions in any systematic way.” Our experiment was constructed speciﬁcally
to avoid this problem and make sure that subjects would experience each auction format with a
single value matched up against the same opponents who also possessed the same values across
formats (i.e. values were independent across subjects but each subject bid with the same value
in multiple mechanisms). By also doing this systematically multiple times in auctions with dif-
ferent numbers of bidders, we should have given the subjects their best chance at understanding
proﬁtd i ﬀerentials between auction formats as well as how proﬁts might change as the number of
competitors change. Thus we believe that our results on these issues are more deﬁnitive.
The closest theoretical paper to our interest is Smith and Levin (1996), which contains an ex-
ploratory approach to the theory of auction revenue with endogenous mechanism choice in a similar
environment in that they allow for risk averse bidders and try to solve for an entry equilibrium and
revenue ranking across mechanisms. Based on the results of Matthews (1987) showing that bidders
possessing CARA or IARA risk preferences will prefer to enter SB instead of A auctions, Smith
and Levin (1996) are able to establish a clear revenue ranking in those cases with the SB being
clearly revenue dominant. DARA is perhaps the more empirically interesting case, and Matthews
(1987) shows that bidders with these preferences will prefer the A auction to the SB. Determining
a revenue ranking here is diﬃcult because while in equilibrium the A will attract more bidders, the
revenue ranking is highly dependent on how many more the A attracts than the SB and how far
above the RN level that those bidders in the SB bid. Smith and Levin were able to derive no clear
result in this case to suggest which of the two mechanisms should be revenue dominant. We do not
point this out as a criticism of their paper but rather to make it clear that existing theory suggests
an indeterminate result in regard to which format will raise more money when endogenous entry
is allowed under the empirically plausible assumption of DARA risk preferences.
In addition to the results described above, our experiments will show that risk aversion (or
degree of overbidding) does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect bidders’ entry decisions. Furthermore, assuming
the type of risk aversion bidders possessed satisﬁes DARA,4 we ﬁnd that the expected utility for
choosing the ﬁrst price auction is greater than the expected utility for choosing the ascending
auction for any risk averse bidder suggesting that we are observing “overentry” into the ascending
auction perhaps due to the existence of some disutility for entering into the ﬁrst price auction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we will provide a description
of our experiment. In section 3 we present our results and in section 4 we provide a discussion
regarding how we believe our results should be interpreted.
2 Design of Experiments
Our experiments consisted of two phases. The ﬁrst phase we will refer to as the learning stage
as in this stage we had the subjects participate in several rounds of ascending (A) and sealed bid
(SB) auctions with diﬀering but exogenously ﬁxed n’s. This was to allow subjects to develop some
experience with both auction formats and to give them some idea of how proﬁt levels might vary
4We will make one further assumption and assume that the preferences of the subjects can be described by the
constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility function, u(x)=x
α, as this satisﬁes DARA.
4with n. In the second phase, subjects were allowed to repeatedly choose to participate in either a
sealed bid auction or an ascending auction5 in which the number of competitors was endogenously
determined.
We conducted 4 sessions of our experiment with twelve subjects per session. In the learning
phase, subjects participated in twelve rounds of ﬁxed n auctions. In each round they were informed
of their value for winning the auction which was drawn independently for each subject from a
uniform distribution over the integers in the range [0,100]. They then participated in both a SB
and A auction using the same value. They would ﬁrst submit a bid in the SB and then immediately
participate in the A and only after the A was completed would they be informed of the results from
both auctions. These twelve rounds consisted of two blocks of six period cycles in which the subjects
participated in three rounds with n =2auctions and then three with n =4 . At the end of the
learning phase the subjects received feedback telling them the session-wide average proﬁti ne a c h
auction format and for each n. They also received information on their total proﬁtu pt ot h i st i m e .
For the main phase of the experiment, we split each session of twelve subjects into separate
groups of six. These groupings were held constant throughout the rest of the session which keeps
t h et w og r o u p si n d e p e n d e n tf o rs t a t i s t i c a lp u r p o s e s .T h ec h o i c eo ft h es i z eo ft h eg r o u p si sav e r y
important one for this experiment. Having six in the pool allows for auction sizes to vary in what
is a key region for this issue. Auctioneers should be mostly concerned about choosing the right
mechanism to maximize revenue in the small n range. At large n’s one will ﬁnd that the revenue
diﬀerences between mechanisms, especially as a percentage of total revenue, get quite small but they
are large for small n. Consequently, if an auctioneer knows he or she will get 8 or more bidders, the
choice of an auction mechanism is much less important than if the number of prospective bidders
is in the 2-6 range. It is also the case that the marginal increase in revenue from one additional
bidder is largest for small n and therefore this is the range in which an auctioneer will ﬁnd it
most important to entice an extra bidder to their auction. This is why we are concentrating on
relatively small pools. Further, having an even number in the prospective bidder pools allows for the
possibility that bidders can split evenly between auctions should that be their natural preference.
Were we to use an odd number and ﬁnd that one format attracted more bidders than the other,
that would be less convincing since the result is almost required by the design. Thus having groups
of size six allows us to concentrate exactly on the important range of the size distribution without
rigging our results in favor of ﬁnding diﬀerences in the number of bidders choosing each auction.
Because we knew subjects would generally prefer the ascending auction, we also wanted to
minimize the rent seeking strategy of attempting to be the one person in the pool to choose the
sealed bid. We wanted to guarantee that an auction it would be competitive if someone chose it.
We did this by taking two of our six group members in each round and placing one in the SB and
the other in the A by default, allowing the other four to choose. This meant that anyone choosing
to enter into an auction knew that they would face at least one other bidder.
An alternative design that might be considered “cleaner” in some sense would have been to
allow the endogenous entry choice in our experiments to be between participating in an auction of
a single format versus not participating. The problem with such a design for our interests is that
a critical component to that design is the structure of the outside option given to subjects who
choose not to participate in a given round. Whether the outside option is a ﬁxed sum of money or a
lottery could be quite important as would the amount of money available in both and the variance
in the second. Our view was that the most ﬁeld relevant way to design that outside option would
5The ascending auctions we used were clock auctions in which the price would start at 0 and increase by 1 ECU
every second up to a maximum of 150 (which is above the maximum value of a subject). Each subject had a button
on their screen to exit the auction and the auction ended when only 1 bidder remained with that bidder paying the
price at which the last bidder dropped out.
5be to have its value also be determined endogenously in the experiment by allowing them to choose
another auction. A prospective e-Bay bidder wishing to procure a particular object could choose to
enter an e-Bay auction for it while his alternatives could include choosing a diﬀerent e-Bay auction,
an Amazon auction, an auction on some specialty auction site or purchasing from a retail outlet.
While we could not allow for this full of a range of options, we believe our design captures the
key element for our interest because our interest is whether or not one auctioneer can pull bidders
away from another auctioneer based solely on the rules of the auction format he or she chooses.
Our design also matches with the description of the formation of early internet auction markets
d e s c r i b e di nL u c k i n g - R e i l e y( 1999b) in which sellers would be selling certain types of trading cards
and diﬀerent sellers would be diﬀerentiated largely by the mechanism they selected for use.
The main phase of our experiment consisted of 30 rounds in which subjects could choose in
which auction to participate. To maximize the number of auction choice periods in the time
allotted, we did not have the subjects actually play the auctions in each round. Instead, each set of
auctions was only conducted with a 20% probability. This allowed us to get more observations on
the auction choice behavior of the subjects which is important because this represents a non-trivial
coordination problem that could take a while to equilibrate. Subjects were not told of their value
before choosing which auction format to enter. It was only revealed after their entry choice and
if the auctions were to be conducted that round. It was, however, made clear to them that they
would receive the same value regardless of which format they chose. Whether the auction round
was conducted or not, they were told the number of people choosing both formats in each round.
If the auctions were being conducted that round, the subjects were told how many other bidders
were in the auction format they were participating in that round before the bidding started so that
they would know the relevant n while formulating their bid. At the end of each round they were
told whether or not they won that round, the price paid by the winner and how much proﬁtt h e y
made.
All experiments were conducted at Technical University Berlin. The software for the exper-
iments was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). Earnings from the experiment were
translated into Euros at the exchange rate of 1 ECU = € 0.10. Subjects’ total earnings ranged
from € 3.00 to € 39.50 with an average of € 22.22 in sessions that lasted approximately 2 hours.6
3R e s u l t s
The ﬁrst prediction we wish to test is the one based upon our work in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon
(2004a) stating that we should observe bidders willing to choose larger ascending rather than smaller
sealed bid (SB) auctions. The outcome of this test leads to our ﬁrst result.
Result 1: The ascending auction attracted more bidders than the sealed bid auction.
The ﬁrst piece of evidence to support this result can be found in the top two rows of table
1 which contains summary statistics regarding the average size of each auction as well as the
average revenue, surplus/earnings and eﬃciency for each subject group. We have removed from
consideration the 2 cases in the data in which an auction period occurred with only 1 person in
the SB in this data and the related statistical tests derived from it. We did this to minimize any
potential distortions to revenue derived from our choice to set a price of 0 in those cases and the
choice to exclude these cases only eﬀe c t sas i n g l er e s u l tt h a tw i l lb ed i s c u s s e db e l o w .W er a nf o u r
sessions of the experiment and in each session we divided subjects into two independent groups.
Thus to use the most conservative approach to examining our results we can use the average auction
6These numbers include a show up fee i.e., starting capital, of €3.00.
61 - A1 - B2 - A2 - B3 - A3 - B4 - A4 - B A v e r a g e
Number of SB 2.64 2.75 2.80 2.60 2.80 2.80 2.67 2.50 2.70
Bidders A 3.36 3.25 3.20 3.40 3.20 3.20 3.33 3.50 3.30
Revenue SB 51.36 61.50 41.20 59.40 57.00 59.20 55.00 49.00 54.96
A 48.55 52.00 71.60 59.00 54.60 41.80 37.33 69.75 53.68
Winner’s SB 9.911 2.33 8.80 5.00 8.20 15.20 11.67 12.50 10.56
Surplus A 20.45 23.08 19.60 21.40 19.80 35.40 23.00 5.50 21.48
Avg Bidder SB 4.07 5.26 3.07 1.87 3.42 5.93 4.75 5.194 . 2 9
Earnings A 6.66 7.00 5.92 6.82 6.20 11.77 7.42 1.44 6.78
Eﬃciency SB 0.972 0.998 0.935 0.994 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.000 0.986
A 1.00 0.986 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.997 0.997
Table 1: Summary of key descriptive statistics of experiment results. Note that the average
column is done oﬀ of individual values. It is not an average of the sessions level averages.
size, revenue and so forth over a session from each of those groups as a single observation giving
us eight observations. Table 1 presents the averages for each group for each measure and therefore
it contains every observation of data necessary for such a test. While this delivers independence
between groups, the observations regarding the ascending and sealed bid auctions are not, however,
independent from each other inside of a group. This can be dealt with by using paired tests to
determine if there are statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the related observations.
The results in table 1 show that for each group, the average size of the ascending auctions
w a sl a r g e rt h a nt h ea v e r a g es i z eo ft h es e a l e db i da u c t i o n s . T h u se v e nw i t ht h er e l a t i v e l ys m a l l
sample size, the results of a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test are a foregone conclusion because it
is essentially based on the number of observations in which the observation from one distribution
are larger than its paired observation from the comparison distribution. In order to make sure all
of our statistical tests are comparable, we will report the results of statistical tests using only the
periods in which auctions were actually conducted.7 The result of a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test
to test the hypothesis that the two distributions are equivalent is a Z-score of 2.46 and a p-value
of 0.01.Ap a i r e dt-test regarding the hypothesis that the means of the two distributions are equal
delivers a result with the same interpretation yielding a t-statistic of 7.747 and a p-value of 0.0001.
Figure 1 shows an alternative way of looking at the number of bidders choosing auctions as
it contains histograms of the number of periods with 1-5 bidders choosing each type of auction.
Recall that in each round, one bidder was forced to be in the SB auction and one in the A. Thus
the smallest auction possible was with n =1and this involves not a single bidder choosing that
format on their own. There were no As with only the single designated bidder while there were 34
SBs that did not attract a single additional bidder (as noted before, only 2 of these rounds lead
to actual auctions in which the lucky bidder received an automatic win at an eﬀective price of 0).
Overall there were 240 auction pairs resulting from entry choices. Of these, 30 pairs resulted in
more bidders in the SB than A (12.5%), 79 pairs resulted in the even 3/3 split (33%), and the other
131 pairs resulted in the A auction having more bidders than the SB (54.5%). These results quite
clearly show that many of the subjects desired to be in the A even if it meant competing against
a larger number of opponents.
7We observe revenue, surplus and eﬃciency only in those periods in which auctions were conducted while we
observe n in all rounds. For consistency, table 1 shows data from only those periods in which an auction was
conducted even though for the number of bidders in the auction, we have more observations. Those additional
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Figure 1: Histograms of number of potential A and SB auctions with 1-5 bidders in them.
It is possible, though, that most subjects chose the A early on but then began choosing the
SB more often once they saw that there were typically more bidders in the A than the SB. To
examine this issue, we can look at whether the frequency with which subjects choose the A versus
SB changed over time. We can run a simple linear ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression using each group as
the unit of observation with the size of the A as the dependent variable and period or the natural
log of the period (to allow for a nonlinear eﬀect) as the independent variable. In the ﬁrst regression
we get a coeﬃcient of 0.006 on period with a standard deviation of 0.006 and a p-value of 0.358
while using the natural log of the period gives a coeﬃcient of 0.002, standard deviation of 0.0672
and a p-value of 0.971. Alternatively, we could compare the distribution of the size of the As in the
ﬁrst 10 periods to the last ten periods using the 8 groups as the units of observation again. The
mean size of an A in the ﬁrst 10 rounds is 3.525 and it is 3.6875 in the last 10. A paired t-test
regarding the equality of these means delivers a test statistic of -1.926 and a p-value of 0.096 while
a Wilcoxon signed rank test yields a Z-score of -1.625 and p-value of 0.104. These results show
that the preference for the A is robust over time and does not degrade when subjects learn that
choosing the A typically means choosing the auction with higher n.
With this result established we can now move to the result of key importance for auction
designers.
Result 2: The revenue generated by both formats is not statistically diﬀerent.
A visual demonstration of the similarity in the revenue generated by both formats can be found
in ﬁgure 2 which shows density plots of the distribution of auction revenues from both auction
formats and of the distribution of the diﬀerence between the paired observations. The two revenue
distributions themselves appear quite similar and the distribution of paired diﬀerences appears
approximately normal with a mean and median at approximately zero. The summaries of the
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Figure 2: Density plots of revenue distributions from both formats and of the distribution of the
revenue diﬀerence between each set of paired observations.
underlying data can be found in table 1. The third and fourth rows contain the average revenue
across all auctions in a session from each independent group. Notice that in about half of the cases
the SB raises more while in the other half the ascending raises more. The overall average revenues
are 54.96 for the SB and 53.68 for the ascending if we average over individual auctions or 54.21
and 54.33 if we calculate the average over the session level averages.8 The most conservative tests
regarding the similarity between these data involve using each of those groups level averages as the
observations. Because revenue in the two auctions formats are linked inside of a group, it is best to
conduct any statistical tests using paired tests and ﬁgure 2 provides evidence that the underlying
distribution (at least at the individual period level) is close enough to normal so that standard
tests are well speciﬁed. A paired t-test regarding the null hypothesis that the means of the two
distributions are equivalent using the group averages as observations results in a t-statistic of 0.02
and a p-value of 0.98 while a similar Wilcoxon signed-rank test results in a Z-score of .042 and
a p-value of 0.67. These tests suggest strongly that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the revenue distributions.
Given the small number of observations at the group level though, there is obviously a concern
that the inability to reject the null hypothesis is due to low power of the test rather than a true
equality of the distributions. That is certainly always a concern with experimental data. Our ﬁrst
point in regard to this is the fact that the conventional wisdom from prior literature is that we
s h o u l de x p e c tt h eS Bt or a i s em o r er e v e n u et h a nt h eA .O u rr e s u l t sa r ea tam i n i m u ms t r o n ge n o u g h
to call that conventional wisdom into doubt and suggest that this notion should be reconsidered.
8For completeness we note that given the auctions conducted were bidders bidding according to the RN equilibrium,
the overall averages would have been 40.05 for the SB and 52.96 for the A. This shows the standard result that bidders
bid higher than predicted in the SB but as predicted in the A.
9The revenue advantage of the SB is at a minimum shown to be substantially diminished in these
experiments which allow endogenous entry.9
Additional tests can be done to lend further support to the claim. There are at least three
ways one might restructure the simple distribution test as a means of decreasing the standard
errors involved in the test to make rejecting the null hypothesis more likely. The ﬁrst might be to
conduct the same tests using each period as an observation rather than aggregating at the session
level. This is the least conservative test of the hypothesis as it involves maximizing the relevant
sample size at the cost of violating the independence assumption across observations. These tests
generate a t−statistic of -0.309 and p−value of 0.759 for a paired t−test and z−score -0.145 and
p−value of 0.885 for a Wilcoxon signed rank-test. So this least conservative test also generates
strong results suggesting that the diﬀerences between the means and medians of the distributions
are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Intermediate approaches involve conducting OLS or ﬁxed
eﬀect panel regressions of revenue on the type of auction and time measures deﬁning the panel by
the independent groups and clustering the standard errors by the groups. These approaches will
take advantage of the individual observations in the data but will also take into account the lack
of independence of the multiple observations per group. We will refrain from including the full set
of regression results on these speciﬁcations to conserve space but according to a broad range of
speciﬁc a t i o n si nt h i sv e i nw eu s e d ,t h ec o e ﬃc i e n to nt h ed u m m yv a r i a b l ef o rt h et y p eo fa u c t i o n
is always small in magnitude and highly insigniﬁcant.10 W h i l ea l lo ft h e s et e s t sc a nn o tp r o v et h e
lack of signiﬁcance result is not the result of type 2 error, the fact that all tests conducted show
the same unambiguous result should suggest that the result is quite robust and is not simply the
result of a small sample.
The simple distribution tests and uncomplicated regressions we use here are particularly ap-
propriate given the issue we are addressing. We could, for example construct a more complex
regression analysis with revenue as a function of the auction format, n, and other characteristics of
bidders to correct for any composition diﬀerences we see in the auction formats. We are, however,
speciﬁcally uninterested in testing the revenue diﬀerence between these mechanisms in such a ceteris
paribus structure because we are speciﬁcally interested in comparing them when these things are
not held equal but rather allowed to vary endogenously. These other issues regarding how auction
revenue changes based upon n and other characteristics are well understood from previous work.
Thus for our purpose of just attempting to determine which auction format raises more revenue
when all things are not equal, the simple tests are more appropriate than more complex conditional
regressions.
We can also again check to see whether this relationship changes over time and the answer is
no. Regressing the diﬀerence in revenue between the ascending and SB auctions and conducting
ﬁxed eﬀect panel regressions with period and then ln(period) as explanatory variables again leads
to results showing a lack of statistical signiﬁcance; coeﬃc i e n to np e r i o di s- 0 . 4 3 5w i t hs t a n d a r d
9Our results do still give the SB a slight revenue advantage overall if the averages are calculated by averaging over
individual auctions and that might lead one to think that this could be signiﬁcant with enough additional observations.
A simple calculation can be done to give an indication of the number of observations that would be required to reject
the null hypothsis here. The mean of the diﬀerences between paired revenue observations at the group level actually
turns out to be is -0.12 showing that the A has a very slight advantage which is one indication that the SB advantage
is in doubt. The standard deviation of that distribution is 17.2. Assuming that with additional observations both
values remain at approximately these magnitudes, the number of observations required to achieve a t−statistic of -2,
approximately what is required to reject the null at a 5% level, is over 80,000. While the sample mean and standard
deviation of the distribution could change with additional observations in such a way as to lower this requirement,
even if the number of observations were decreased by an order of magnitude of 100 it remains beyond the realm of a
feasible experiment.
10Full results are available from the authors upon request.
10deviation of 0.495 and p-value of 0.384 while the coeﬃcient on ln(period) is -7.416w i t has t a n d a r d
deviation of 5.904 and p-value of 0.216. We also ﬁnd a lack of signiﬁcance conducting distribution
tests regarding the revenue diﬀerential between the ﬁrst ten and last ten periods; paired t−test
yields t-statistic of 0.511 and p-value of 0.631 while the Wilcoxon signed rank test yields a Z-score
of 0.524 and a p-value of 0.600. These tests of diﬀerences over time are problematic though as the
data is not very dense due to our not running auctions in all periods. Since there were relatively
few auctions conducted we should not expect any change of bidding behavior based on time. On
the other hand, a selection bias could enter in if certain types of bidders gravitate towards separate
auction formats over time. In any event, we observe no trends in revenue.
While revenue equivalence between these institutions does seem to be restored by allowing
endogenous entry that does not mean that all of the claims of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
are fully satisﬁed. The RET implies not only that revenue will be equivalent but also that the
expected surplus for bidders will be equivalent between auction formats. The latter must hold if
the former holds in the traditional RET due to the fact that there is a ﬁxed n. This means that
the seller and the auction winner are splitting the same amount of surplus between them regardless
of auction format with the price determining the split. In our setting, n is not constant and
therefore equivalence in revenue does not automatically imply equivalence in bidder surplus. Before
comparing bidder surplus across mechanisms, we next establish that one of the classic assumptions
in the RET turns out to be valid which is that both formats are approximately equally eﬃcient as
well as approximately perfectly eﬃcient.
Result 3: There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the eﬃciency between the two formats.
Once again, the group level data is presented in table 1.W h a tw eﬁnd is that virtually all of
our auctions were 100% eﬃcient, including the sealed bid auctions. Paired test results regarding
the hypothesis that the means of both distributions are equal result in a t-statistic of 1.40 with
p-value of 0.20 and a Wilcoxon signed rank Z-statistic of 1.25 with a p-value of 0.21.T h u sw ec a n
not reject the hypothesis that these two distributions are equivalent. This is contrary to the results
found in other studies beginning with Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) showing that sealed bid
auctions are typically less eﬃcient than ascending.
Our next result attempts to verify the last component of the RET, that bidders earn equal
s u r p l u sa c r o s sm e c h a n i s m s ,b u tt h i si sc o m p l i c a t e db yt h en a t u r eo ft h ee x p e r i m e n t .
Result 4: Winning bidders earn on average more money in the ascending auctions than sealed
bid auctions. Average surplus earned by all bidders is slightly more in the ascending than sealed
bid auctions.
Table 1 again shows the group averages for bidder surplus in the two auction formats. In all
but one pair the surplus earned by the winners is greater in the A than in the SB auction and
paired statistical tests will show that this diﬀerence is clearly statistically signiﬁc a n t .T h i si sn o t
a surprising result because we have previously established that prices are about the same between
mechanisms but there are more bidders in the A. The latter fact means that the expected highest
value in the groups participating in the A must be greater than the expected highest value of those
participating in the SB; actual averages of the highest values in each format are 75.4 for the A and
66.44 for the SB. Because we have also found that the auctions are highly eﬃcient, the average
values of the winners must be very close to these levels and so it must also be the case that the
winners in the A earn more surplus. This does not mean though that bidders earn more on average
or in expectation. This is so because of the fact that the number of competitors in each format is
diﬀerent. We can take one step towards more accurately determining what is going on by looking at
average proﬁts of bidders in both mechanisms. Average proﬁt is calculated by taking each auction
11and dividing the realized surplus of the winner by the number of bidders in that speciﬁca u c t i o n
to yield a properly weighted average proﬁtm e a s u r e . T a b l e1 also contains the average bidder
earnings for each of the eight groups as separate samples. The average earnings are 6.65 and 4.20
for the A and SB if we average over the group averages or 6.78 and 4.29 if we average over the
individual periods. This suggests a slight advantage for the A and statistical tests regarding these
distributions show there the diﬀerence between these average earnings distributions is borderline
signiﬁcant. A paired t−test delivers a t−statistic of 2.437 and p−value of 0.045 while a Wilcoxon
signed rank test yields a z−score of 1.68 and p−value of 0.093.
This is the only result that is eﬀected by our choice to remove those two outlier cases in which
the SB auctions had only a single bidder and those two bidders “won” the auction at a price of 0. If
we include those periods then average earnings from averaging over sessions are 6.48 in the A and
5.96 in the SB. A paired t-test regarding the equality of these sample means yields a t-statistic of
0.3013w i t hap-value of 0.7719 while a Wilcoxon signed rank test yields a z-statistic of 0.420 and a
p-value of 0.6744. Both tests show a lack of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in surplus across mechanisms. So
t h eb o r d e r l i n es i g n i ﬁcant result found by excluding these two outliers is reversed by their inclusion.
Which representation is the more reasonable is a debatable issue. Our interpretation is that the
results suggest that there is a small earnings diﬀerence in favor of the A but it was likely small
enough such that subjects may not have been able to detect it.
Were the numbers of bidders in both formats equivalent, then looking at either the surplus of the
winners or the average surplus would be suﬃcient to allow us to conclude that the expected surplus
is equivalent across institutions. While looking at these averages by themselves is interesting,
ultimately what we want to do is obtain a more accurate measure of expected earnings which
involves conditioning on the value of the bidder. Thus we want to provide an answer to the question
of which format should generate higher earnings conditioned on the value v ab i d d e rp o s s e s s e s .
In the process of calculating a more careful expected value for our potential bidders, we also need
to take into account the fact that bidders might possess utility functions other than risk neutrality.
One of the standard explanations for the “overbidding” observed in the ﬁrst price auctions is risk
aversion and in calculating the expected utility of participating in either auction we will make
our calculations general enough to also allow for an investigation of how such preferences might
impact the results. A key detail in such an analysis is whether or not there are selection eﬀects due
to risk preferences or more generally propensity to overbid in the SB driving the auction choice
behavior. There are a number of reasons either risk aversion or propensity to overbid might lead to
self-selection into auction formats. One argument is based on that notion that risk averse bidders
should be more willing to enter into the ﬁrst price auction. This is so because while they may expect
roughly equal or maybe even lower proﬁt in the SB than the A, the earnings in the sealed bid auction
are more stable which is attractive to risk averse bidders. The stability is due to both the standard
reasons SB earnings are more stable than A earnings and the fact that with the smaller n in the SB,
they will win more often than in the ascending making some surplus more likely. If this selection
occurs then this could have an impact on how we model the expected opponent bidders might face
in SB auctions. Based upon our prior experimental results in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a),
we showed that bidders who are more risk averse than average should actually be willing to pay
slightly more to enter an A auction than bidders who are closer to being risk neutral. This was
due to the extra stability in earnings in the SB not making up for the substantial drop in earnings
relative to the A. The diﬀerence we found was not large, though. Therefore, our hypothesis is that
if the overbidding is due to risk aversion then we should not see much correlation between risk
aversion and auction choice.
Selection eﬀects could also occur if subjects are risk neutral but are heterogeneous in their
propensity to overbid for non-risk aversion related reasons. A bidder who regularly bids well above
12the RN NE level in the SB will ﬁnd himself to be making little money in those auctions and the
fact that his proﬁts are more stable should not make up at all for the expected proﬁtg a pb e t w e e n
the A and SB. Thus it would be reasonable to expect that such bidders would avoid the SB and
instead participate in the more lucrative (especially for them) A auctions. A bidder who bids closer
to RN might well have little reason to avoid the SB as when she wins in the SB, her proﬁti s
quite large. Such behavior would lead to a positive correlation between degree of overbidding and
likelihood of choosing the ascending auction. This hypothesis is complicated by the fact that if
the bidder is risk neutral then there must be an alternative explanation for the overbidding. If the
underlying cause of underbidding is something else then the nature of that explanation could lead
to a diﬀerent prediction. While examining this selection issue, we can simultaneously look more
generally at whether or not we can identify the determinants of a bidder’s choice of an auction
mechanism.
Result 5: Neither risk aversion nor more generally the degree of overbidding has a statistically
signiﬁcant aﬀect on auction choice. Most other experience based variables also have no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on auction choice.
All we observe about the bidders prior to their choices of auctions is their results from the
training phase. Thus what we will be looking at ﬁrst is whether or not experience in that phase
impacted auction choice. The chief characteristic we can observe about an individual is their risk
aversion or degree of overbidding. We will use in one of our speciﬁcations a subject’s estimated risk
aversion parameter assuming a CRRA utility function of u(x)=xα. This delivers a bid function
of b∗(vi)=
(n−1)vi
α+(n−1) which suggests a regression of bit = βi1 + βi2vit + εit to capture the degree
of risk aversion of the bidder. In our regressions regarding auction choice we will include αi =
1
βi2 (nit − 1) − nit +1which can be interpreted as a measure of risk aversion or more generally as
am e a s u r eo fo v e r b i d d i n g . 11 In our second speciﬁcation we use βi2 itself as a direct measure of
overbidding that is independent of a speciﬁcation of a utility function. The measure we actually
used is the average of the values found for βi2 when using only the data from n =2auctions and
then using only the data from n =4auctions. Both measures, αi and the average of the βi2 values,
should and do yield highly similar outcomes.
Before presenting the regression results it is worth describing in broad terms the nature of
the choice paths of the subjects. Subjects had 20 periods each when they were allowed to choose
b e t w e e nAa n dS B .E a c hs u b j e c th a d10 rounds where they were used as the default bidder in either
the A or SB. On average subjects chose the A 12.8 times out of 20 and the SB 7.2. Further 33
out of the 48 subjects chose the A more often than the SB and 7 subjects chose the A exclusively.
No subjects chose the SB exclusively but there was 1 subject who chose it 18t i m e sa n d2w h o
chose it 17( 14 subjects though chose the A 17 or more times). So this is clear evidence again of
the fact that the A was the more popular of the two. Further almost one third of the subjects
had choices with too little variability to be explainable as anything other than pure preference for
the ascending auction. The other subjects were switching between formats in a manner that might
suggest their preference for the A is weaker or at least that there were conditions that would lead to
them choosing the SB. To determine what those conditions are, we can conduct both cross section
and panel regressions to try to understand the factors that determined those choices.
Our ﬁrst approach will be a simple cross-sectional regression using each subject as a separate
data point. The dependent variable is the fraction of times a subject chose the ascending auction.
11To estimate the risk aversion parameter we used all of the sealed bid auctions from the learning phase which
consists of 6 auctions with n =2and 6 with n =4 . We also ran the regressions using risk aversion parameters
estimated for each size n separately as well as the average of those two estimates. There was not a substantial
diﬀerence in the ﬁnal results.
13Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Parameter Coeﬀ Std Error p-Value Coeﬀ Std Error p-Value
RA 0.105 0.150 0.487 - - -
Avg βi2 - - - 0.037 0.260 0.887
N2Proﬁt -0.001 0.001 0.145 -0.002 0.001 0.052
N2Win 0.733 0.268 0.009 0.768 0.267 0.006
N4Proﬁt -0.004 0.002 0.059 -0.004 0.002 0.086
N4Win -0.492 0.268 0.074 -0.406 0.271 0.141
N2SesProﬁt -0.000 0.001 0.918- 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0.781
N4SesProﬁt 0.003 0.002 0.143 0.002 0.002 0.160
Constant 0.542 0.346 0.125 0.037 0.260 0.887
Obs(Groups)=464(48) R
2 =0 .171,P r o b>F=0 .039 R
2 =0 .161,Pr o b>F=0 .047
Table 2: Cross section regressions with fraction of times a subject has chosen the ascending
auction as the dependent variable. All variables except RA and Avg βi2 are diﬀerences between
the measure for the ascending auctions minus the measure for the sealed bid auctions.
The independent variables are various measures from the learning phase. To make the estimation
more parsimonious and to focus on what is more likely to be a driving factor in a subject’s decision
making, all variables except the risk parameter are diﬀerences between the relevant value in the A
and the in the SB though we do have separate variables for the n =2and n =4auction periods.
These variables include NxProﬁt which is the average proﬁtt h es u b j e c tm a d ei nt h eAp e r i o d s
minus the proﬁt he made in the SB periods in the n = x periods, NxWin which is the diﬀerence
in the win percentages for that subject in n = x periods and then the session level average proﬁt
diﬀerentials. We have also computed the regression with actual levels instead of diﬀerences and we
e n du pw i t ht h es a m ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The results of both speciﬁc a t i o n so ft h i sr e g r e s s i o na r ef o u n di nt a b l e2 . T h e r ei so n l yo n e
variable that is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in both speciﬁcations, N2Win, and it has a positive
coeﬃcient. This suggests that if a subject wins in the ascending more often than in the SB in n =2
periods, then he is more likely to choose the ascending later on. There are a few other variables that
might be considered borderline signiﬁcant, but they are small in magnitude. Further, the overall
explanatory power of both regressions is quite low with R
2 =0 .171 and R
2 =0 .161 respectively.
The results from this regression match with those in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) show-
ing that preferences between auction formats do not seem to be inﬂuenced much by outcomes
in the learning stage. Further, neither measure of risk aversion nor degree of overbidding inﬂu-
ences auction choice behavior. This suggests that not only is there not self-selection into auction
formats according to risk aversion but also that there is no self-selection based upon some other
characteristic associated with overbidding.
We can alternatively look at the subjects’ choices between formats in a time series manner by
examining their individual choices across time using panel techniques. Due to the design of our
experiment though (i.e. the fact that auctions were not conducted in all periods) it is diﬃcult
to conduct such regressions due to the sparseness of the data. In most of the 30 periods of the
experiment, the only data we observe is the number of subjects choosing each auction format. If
we conduct a panel logit regression with ﬁxed eﬀects to correct for any subject level diﬀerences
using the choice of format as the dependent variable (1=ascending, 0=SB) then we get a coeﬃcient
of -0.070 on the number of people in the ascending auction last period with a standard error of
140.059 and a p-value of 0.233. If we include variables regarding their experience in the auctions
conducted (i.e. whether they won in period t − 1,p r o ﬁti nt − 1 etc. . .) the data becomes very
sparse due to all of the missing variables causing interpretation of the coeﬃcients to be suspect.
Given that, when conducting such regressions we ﬁnd that all variables are insigniﬁcant except
the previous period’s choice. We conclude from this analysis that the subjects have some intrinsic
preference for one format over another represented by the ﬁxed eﬀect or constant in the regression
and even beyond that there is some amount of inertia in regard to their choices. This analysis does
not reveal any other strong factors which ﬁgure in to a subjects decision of which format to enter.
This may well indicate that most subjects were following a mixed strategy for entering into each
auction as might be reasonable to avoid situations in which everyone simultaneously switches from
one crowded auction format to the other. The probabilities for those mixed strategies were not
50/50 though and these results are strong enough to show that even those potential mixed strategy
propensities were uncorrelated with “overbidding” or risk aversion.
Because we observe no selection eﬀects based on risk preferences or overbidding in general, we
can use a straightforward method to calculate the expected utilities of participating in each auction
format. We will assume a CRRA utility function or u(x)=xα with α ∈ (0,1] where α =1is risk
neutrality and α<1 is risk aversion. To calculate the expected utility in both formats we used
equations 1 and 2. To calculate the expected utility in the ﬁrst price auction, we have to sum over all
possible sizes of auctions, 1−5, adding the expected utility of participating in an auction of each size
multiplied by the probability of the auction being of that size. This latter probability is obtained
from the data as the empirical percentage of auctions conducted of each size and given by g(n). For
an auction of any speciﬁc size, we sum over all possible values the bidder might draw the surplus the
bidder makes if he wins multiplied by his probability of winning with all of this multiplied by the
probability of drawing that particular value. We are calculating the probability of any bid winning
using the empirical bid distribution from all auctions conducted of each size which means we are
taking no stand in regard to the process generating the competing bids. Thus for any bid x we
calculate the probability that the bidder draws n−1 opponent bids from the empirical distribution
that are less than x. This is given by B(x,n)n−1. We are assuming for simplicity that the bid
function used by the risk averse bidder is the standard linear bid function for a risk averse bidder
without the correction for the non-linear “hook” at high values derived from the heterogeneous risk
preferences of the opponents. Since our actual bidders may not be bidding according to this bid
function, using it does involve making important assumptions whose consequences we will discuss
later. Ignoring the hook on the function will lead to our underestimating the expected utility of
choosing a ﬁrst price auction. As our results will show though, an error in this direction will not
eﬀect our conclusions so we opted for this simpler approach for calculating expected utilities. All

















To calculate the expected utilities in the A, we must follow a similar approach. Again we
sum the expected utility of participating in an auction of size n over all possible auction sizes and
multiply by the empirical fraction of auctions of each size, h(n). Since bidders in A do bid for the
most part as theory predicts, the rest of the calculation is perfectly straightforward and requires
no questionable assumptions. We sum over all possible values and then over all possible prices the
bidder might pay adding the utility in each case times the probability of that price being the price
paid and ﬁnally multiplying by the probability that the bidder draws that particular value. This
calculation is given by equation 2.









































We calculated the expected utility for choosing each auction format for all α ∈ {0.01,0.02...,0.99,1}
and have presented the results in ﬁgure 3. It is quite easy to see that for any α ∈ (0,1] the expected
utility for choosing the SB is greater than the expected utility for choosing the A. This is true even
though we are not properly downwardly adjusting the bids the bidders might place at high values
leading us to underestimate the expected utility of the ﬁrst price mechanism. This suggests that if
any given subject were choosing purely on the basic of risk preferences that their best response to
the empirical distributions would be to choose the ﬁrst price auction. This is true regardless of α.
This result is consistent with the fact that we do not observe auction choice to be correlated
with α. There is no indication that bidders more or less risk averse than average should be more or
less likely to choose either format. This result also suggests “over entry” into the ascending auction
above and beyond what can be accounted for by risk preferences. This result is perfectly consistent
with the ﬁndings in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a).
One might however ﬁnd this result to contradict the result we found earlier that bidders on
average earned slightly more on average in the A than SB since we are now arguing that the expected
utilities show the opposite format to be “better.” If the subjects are risk averse as indicated in their
bidding behavior then the fact that one format yields a slightly higher average payoﬀ while being
lower in expected value is certainly possible given the relative stability of payoﬀsi nt h et w of o r m a t s .
In that case, the indication is that the expected utility results are the key ones to examine.
16If however, subjects are not bidding as they are due to risk aversion, then a reinterpretation
is needed. The theoretical result in ﬁgure 3 is derived based on the assumptions that a bidder is
RN and bids accordingly in the SB. The relationship can be explained by noting that a RN bidder
participating in the SB they will expect to make a large surplus if they win because they will face a
relatively small number of competitors compared to the A. That in turn means they will bid below
what would be the expected price in a similar A auction. Thus their expected utility for the SB
should be higher than the A. As bidders become more risk averse, they will be making less and
less surplus in the event of a win in the SB but at the same time their probability of winning is
increasing and this is enough to compensate them in expected utility terms. Thus bidders should
have a higher expected utility for the SB given the observed data. This comparison is accurate for
those bidders whose behavior in both the bidding and auction choice stages is captured by our
model. If, however, a bidder is actually risk neutral but is overbidding in the SB for some other
reason, then the attractiveness of the SB to them will be substantially less than what is indicated
in ﬁgure 3. Whether the attractiveness is diminished by enough to overcome the large gap shown
in ﬁgure 3 is entirely dependent on their degree of overbidding as well as why they are doing so.
Thus the overall result is somewhat indeterminate.
There are two approaches one can take in rationalizing all of the results discussed here. One
approach involves rejecting the idea that risk aversion accounts for the bidding behavior in the ﬁrst
price auctions. If one adopts this view then ﬁgure 3 combined with result 4 will likely be taken
as evidence that risk aversion also fails to explain auction choice behavior. The auction choice
behavior observed here could be explained by arguing that subjects are basically risk neutral and
are arbitraging between the two formats. The slight advantage for the A auction may not have
been large enough to be detectable in the relatively short time horizon for earnings to be completely
equalized. The main deﬁciency here is that one is left without an explanation for the overbidding in
the ﬁrst price auction. Depending on how that issue is dealt with there may be a puzzle regarding
why those bidders who overbid by more in the SB than other were not self-selecting out of it and
without an explanation for the behavior observed in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) which is
inconsistent with this arbitrage story.
If one is willing to accept that risk aversion can at least partially account for the bidding behavior
in ﬁrst price auctions and that people have a non-pecuniary preference for the ascending auction
then we can provide an explanation for all of the observed behavior. The results presented above
match quite well with what was predicted in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a). We observe
that most subjects will sacriﬁce some degree of expected utility to choose an ascending auction
instead of a ﬁrst price auction. The reason they would be willing to make such a sacriﬁce is easily
explainable based on the diﬀerence in mental costs of participating in sealed bid auctions relative
to ascending or minimizing the possibility of regret.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The results from this paper clearly show that the revenue ranking of sealed bid and ascending
auctions for ﬁeld applications is not necessarily as resolved an issue as one might think from reading
most of the related literature. Our results show that entry decisions are quite important to this
issue and ignoring them can lead to a distorted view of which auction mechanism is likely to raise
the most revenue. In our speciﬁc environment by allowing subjects to freely choose to enter either
a sealed bid or an ascending auction, we found results showing that the two mechanisms result in
approximately equal revenue to the sellers in both mechanisms as well as equal eﬃciency. We ﬁnd
a small advantage for the ascending auction in regard to bidder surplus but we still end up quite
17close to restoring the claims of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. This provides at least a partial
resolution to the question of why auctioneers continue to use ascending auctions in the ﬁeld despite
the prior evidence suggesting ﬁrst price auctions generate more revenue.
The environment we chose to examine in our experiments is, of course, highly stylized and
it is important to be clear on what our results suggest about what one should expect to ﬁnd in
naturally occurring markets. It is clear from our results that bidders were arbitraging to some
degree between these two formats. That accounts for the approximate equality in average earnings
/ expected utility across mechanisms. This is behavior exactly in line with what economists expect
to see in market settings and it seems quite reasonable to expect that this observed tendency in
our data should generalize outside of the laboratory. The fact that this behavior also leads to equal
r e v e n u ei nb o t hf o r m a t si sm o r ed i ﬃc u l tt og e n e r a l i z ed u et ot h ef a c tt h a tw eu s eo n l yas i n g l ep o o l
size and a single value distribution. In the exploratory results in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2005), they have a few sessions with larger pools (one with 20 bidders) and ﬁnd a comparable
result. This suggests our ﬁnding is broader than just in our environment.
The key result in our study, though, is not the approximate revenue equivalence, though, but
r a t h e rt h ef a c tt h a tw eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h er e v e n u ei nt h ea s c e n d i n ga u c t i o nc a nr i s eh i g he n o u g h
when endogenous entry is allowed to call into question the assumed revenue superiority of the sealed
bid auction. We argue that this result is driven by subjects arbitraging between mechanisms on
the basis of expected utility comparisons but with a component of this calculation due to some
disutility for participating in ﬁrst price auctions. The reason why this behavior seems to robustly
lead to approximate revenue equivalence is still unclear. That result may well be an artifact of
the uniform value distribution as that is used in both this study and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2005). It is certainly possible that in other environments the ascending auction could raise
more money while in others the ﬁrst price may raise more. This indicates a clear need for a more
general theory of endogenous auction choice expanding on Smith and Levin (1996) that can better
characterize when we should expect this approximate revenue equivalence and when we should
expect one format to raise more money than the other. What is clear though is that the ﬁrst
price auction is not necessarily revenue dominant and that endogenous entry is a key component
in revenue comparisons that should not be overlooked.
Another avenue to examining this issue might involve examining a bidder’s choice between
entering an auction of a speciﬁct y p ev e r s u sa c c e p t i n gs o m eo u t s i d eo p t i o na st h i si sa na l t e r n a t i v e
characterization of the decision faced by participants in online auctions. We chose not to conduct
the experiments in this manner mostly due to the diﬃculty in properly calibrating the outside
option to generate a “fair” comparison. There is reason to expect, though, that the eﬀect we
provide evidence for will be robust in this alternate setting. First, if bidders possess a preference
for the ascending auction as we have robustly demonstrated, then this preference should transfer
leading to an edge for the ascending auction in attracting bidders away from any given outside
option. Second, Pevnitskaya (2004) and Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2004) show both theoretically
and using experimental data that when faced with the choice of a certain outside option (e.g. buying
the item in a store at a known price) versus a ﬁrst price auction, the more risk averse bidders will
choose the outside option with greater likelihood. Because these are the bidders driving the high
revenues in ﬁrst price auctions, the result is that the outside option blunts the only advantage of
the ﬁrst price auction.12 Consequently, there is every reason to suspect that our result would be
12There is another paper on outside options that ﬁnds the opposite result, Kirkchamp, Poen, and Reiss (2005), but
the implementation of the outside option is quite diﬀerent. In Kirkchamp, Poen, and Reiss (2005), the outside option
is not chosen by the bidder as an alternative to participating in the auction but rather is implemented as an amount
earned if the bidder loses the auction. This is found to increase overbidding in the ﬁrst price auction. The issue that
paper does not investigate is the important entry decision of the bidders which will lead to n being variable. Thus it
18robust to allowing the choice to be participating in an auction versus choosing an outside option.
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